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ABSTRACT
Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves 
the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response 
to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illus-
trate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking 
a potential consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhu-
man animals might entail that they should be held morally account-
able for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more 
than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-
order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness or wrong-
ness of affecting another’s mental states. This “moral thought” about 
the rightness or wrongness is not yet demonstrated in even the most 
intelligent nonhuman animals, thus we should suspend our judgments 
about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of their actions while further 
questioning the recent insistence on developing an animal morality. 
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1. Introduction
Higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness as-
sume that a mental state is conscious only if the subject has (or 
is disposed to have) a further higher-order thought, belief, or 
judgment that she is in said mental state (Rosenthal 1986; Car-
ruthers 2000). A mental state being conscious, then, cannot be 
reduced to the mere having of mental states; rather, conscious-
ness is said to arise only when one has a further higher-order 
belief or thought about a lower-order mental state of, say, pain. 
In keeping with the criteria of such theories of consciousness, 
certain HOT theorists such as Gennaro (1993, 2009) and Lurz 
(2011) attempt to illustrate that nonhuman animals are con-
scious, even according to a HOT standard. Presumably, by do-
ing so, the moral arena will be extended to nonhuman animals, 
who too are said to be conscious according to even a HOT stan-
dard.
Although animal ethicists would consider this a victory, 
what is commonly overlooked is a potentially alarming conse-
quence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals 
might require that we hold them morally accountable for their 
actions. As Francescotti writes, “one is a moral agent only if 
one is capable of having thoughts about the welfare of others—
which would consist, at least in part, in thoughts about the men-
tal states of others” (2007, 246). Thus, we must proceed cau-
tiously so that the attempt to demonstrate higher-order thought 
in nonhuman animals avoids a commitment to moral agency. 
The concern, then, is the following: if HOT theories of con-
sciousness are correct, the only way to ensure that nonhuman 
animals are afforded direct moral consideration is to demon-
strate that they possess HOT. Yet, if nonhuman animals meet 
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the criteria for having HOT, they could be said to be moral 
agents since “higher-order intentionality seems relevant to the 
issue of moral agency” (Francescotti 2007, 246). 
In the following discussion, I will demonstrate that there 
is a specific type of higher-order thought that is necessary for 
moral agency: moral thought third-order intentionality, which 
concerns a belief about the rightness or wrongness of affect-
ing another’s mental states. Such a higher-order thought, as I 
call it “moral thought,” requires that one be able to not only, 
for instance, desire to deceive another or produce a false belief 
in another, but also that one possess a further higher-order be-
lief that such a desire to deceive is either right or wrong. This 
“moral thought” about the rightness or wrongness of a given 
desire cannot be demonstrated, with certainty, in even the most 
intelligent of fully developed nonhuman animals. Thus we can 
ensure the moral considerability of nonhuman animals under 
a HOT theory of consciousness without a commitment to the 
view that they are therefore moral agents. While this conclu-
sion might seem rather obvious, it is useful in motivating a 
critical response to the growing movement to demonstrate that 
nonhuman animals are moral beings or subjects. 
2. What is consciousness? 
Mental states such as beliefs, desires, perceptions, and sen-
sations are either unconscious or conscious. For example, one 
may have a belief that “today is Thursday” without conscious-
ly entertaining it because her mind is preoccupied with some 
other matter, such as the consciously entertained belief that it 
is raining outside and the desire to find an umbrella. Pains and 
bodily sensations can also be unconscious: one can have a pain 
in her leg, even though the subject is preoccupied with some 
other matter and is not consciously attending to the pain. This 
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possession of an unconscious state of pain is one example of 
how a being could be said to have a pain without actually expe-
riencing or feeling the pain (Carruthers 1992).   
A debate within consciousness studies concerns what it 
means for a mental state to be “phenomenally conscious.” Phe-
nomenal consciousness (p-consciousness) is defined by Block 
(1995) in terms of what it is like for the subject to have the 
conscious experiences she does. Carruthers points out that p-
consciousness is the property only conscious mental states pos-
sess: it is the “property that perceptions and bodily sensations 
possess when there is something that it is like for a creature to 
undergo those events, or when the events in question possess 
a subjective feel” (2011, 374). Thus, the central claim is that 
a mental state is conscious only if it has a phenomenology of 
inner feel—a “something it is like” aspect, as coined by Nagel 
(1974).  
Two important approaches to phenomenal consciousness 
are first-order representational (FOR) theories and higher-
order representational theories (HOR). The primary focus of 
both representational approaches is an attempt to explain state 
consciousness (rather than creature consciousness). That is, the 
concern is not about the consciousness of a particular creature 
(such as whether or not Kimberly is conscious)—rather, the 
concern is whether or not a mental state is conscious, such as 
my belief that today is Thursday.   
As described by Lurz, “first-order representational (FOR) 
theories hold that mental states are conscious not because the 
subject is higher-order aware of having them but because the 
states themselves make the subject aware of the external en-
vironment” (2009, 9).  Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995) explain 
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consciousness in terms of world-directed or first-order inten-
tional states: mental states such as perceptual experiences and 
bodily sensations are said to be conscious if they affect or are 
poised to affect one’s belief-forming system. According to 
Carruthers (2005), if some form of first-order phenomenal con-
sciousness is correct, then phenomenal consciousness will be 
widespread in the animal community. Since nonhuman animals 
often form beliefs about their environment based upon their 
perceptual states and bodily sensations, they are said to possess 
conscious perceptual states and experience bodily sensations 
under a FOR theory. Since a mental state can be phenomenally 
conscious, according to a FOR approach, even when it is not 
represented by another higher-order mental state, higher order 
representations (higher-order beliefs, perceptions, or thoughts) 
are not necessary for phenomenal consciousness. 
Higher-order representational (HOR) theories maintain that 
a mental state is conscious only when there is a higher-order 
representation of the mental state. Within HOR theories of con-
sciousness there are two dominant approaches:  HOP (Higher-
order perception) and HOT (higher-order thought). HOP theo-
rists (Armstrong 1980; Lycan 1996) maintain that conscious-
ness is explained in terms of inner perception of mental states, 
which does not require the capacity to conceptualize mental 
states. While HOP theories pose little threat to the claim of 
animal consciousness, HOT theories present a significant chal-
lenge to the claim that nonhuman animals are conscious. 
3. A closer look at higher-order thought theo-
ries 
HOT theorists attempt to explain intransitive state conscious-
ness in terms of transitive creature consciousness. Transitive 
consciousness is described as consciousness of something. 
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Since mental states are not conscious of anything, transitive 
consciousness applies only to creatures and is thus a form of 
creature consciousness. Rowlands (2011, 536) notes that we 
can derive two central conclusions from the claim that intransi-
tive state consciousness can be explained in terms of transitive 
creature consciousness: (1) a mental state M of creature C is 
(intransitively) conscious if and only if C is (transitively) con-
scious of M, and (2) creature C is (transitively) conscious of 
mental state M if and only if C has a thought to the effect that 
it has M. So, (1) a mental state possessed by an animal, such as 
pain, is (intransitively) conscious only if the animal is (transi-
tively) conscious of the pain, and (2) a creature is (transitively) 
conscious of the pain only if the creature has a higher-order 
thought about the pain. The central claim is the following: tran-
sitive creature consciousness is ultimately explainable in terms 
of a higher-order thought—a thought about a mental state (from 
here on out, I will refer to transitive creature consciousness as 
simply “consciousness”). 
As Seager (2004) and Dretske (1995) point out, HOT theo-
ries seem to impose a great burden of conceptual ability since 
they maintain that consciousness requires the capacity to think 
about and conceptualize one’s own thoughts. This is evident in 
Rosenthal’s (1986) HOT account which maintains that a mental 
state is not conscious unless one is aware of that state—where 
awareness entails that one has a thought about the first-order 
mental state. Thus, to be conscious of something, or aware of 
something, is to be “in a mental state whose content pertains to 
that thing” (Rosenthal 1986, 27). 
HOT theories thus present two possible conclusions regard-
ing animal consciousness: 1) the denial that nonhuman animals 
are conscious, or 2) the granting of a greater conceptual capac-
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ity to nonhuman animals than they are traditionally credited 
with (Seager 2004). Carruthers (2000) and Davidson (1975) 
endorse the first line of thought by arguing that nonhuman 
animals are unable to meet the intellectual, cognitive, and con-
ceptual standard of high-order thought theories. Others, as we 
will see, attempt to demonstrate HOT in nonhuman animals by 
pointing to their capacity for metacognition, mindreading, or 
even language. 
4. The significance of animal conscious-
ness 
As Carruthers (1992) points out, determining whether or 
not the mental states of nonhuman animals are conscious will 
shape the animal ethics debate. This is to say that the moral 
status of a being is fundamentally tied to its mental status: an 
entity must possess transitive creature consciousness (and thus 
intransitive state consciousness) in order for it to be morally 
considerable. Since only conscious mental states, and not un-
conscious mental states, have phenomenal properties or subjec-
tive feels, only creatures who possess conscious mental states 
can be said to have sentience: the fundamental criterion of 
moral considerability in most accounts of animal ethics (Singer 
1975; Francione 2000; Rollin 2006). If nonhuman animals are 
not sentient, they cannot be said to have phenomenal feels or 
subjective experiences of pain and suffering, thus making it asi-
nine to criticize the exploitation of nonhuman animals on the 
ground that it forces nonhuman animals to endure excruciating 
pain and suffering. 
Nonhuman animals are commonly assumed to be sentient 
based on their behavioral and physiological responses to ad-
verse stimuli which presumably indicate that nonhuman ani-
mals do in fact have mental states such as pain or pleasure 
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(Singer 1975; Francione 2000; Rollin 2006). At first glance, it 
seems uncontroversial to attribute sentience to nonhuman ani-
mals based on their behavior and physiological make-up, yet if 
animal ethicists fail to provide an account of animal minds that 
satisfies the requirements of HOT theories, they remain vulner-
able to the challenges presented by certain HOT theorists who 
argue that consciousness requires an intellectual, cognitive, or 
conceptual component. According to Carruthers, since animals 
cannot think about their experiences, they can “have pains, 
[although] they do not feel pains” (Carruthers 1992, 2). This 
line of thought is echoed by Dennett, who claims that many 
philosophers mistakenly assume that all pain is “experienced 
pain” (Dennett 2008, 118).
Although the central goal of this paper is to motivate a con-
cern for nonhuman animals in conversations regarding HOT 
theories of consciousness, this discussion should not be mis-
construed as an argument for HOT theories of consciousness. 
Rather, the intent is to illustrate that nonhuman animals have 
HOT, which prepares animal ethicists against the anticipated 
charge that nonhuman animals are not conscious due to a lack 
of cognitive sophistication. That is, if it turns out that HOT 
theories are correct (or even if popular opinion supports a HOT 
theory without it actually being correct), animal ethicists must 
demonstrate the capacity for HOT in nonhuman animals in or-
der to ensure that they are afforded moral attention. Further-
more, demonstrating HOT in nonhuman animals is helpful in 
ensuring their moral considerability under any theory of con-
sciousness. If we can illustrate that nonhuman animals have 
consciousness under a HOT account, then it is likely that ani-
mal consciousness will be demonstrable in any other theory of 
consciousness, since HOT is said to require the greatest con-
ceptual burden.    
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So, if we grant, for argument’s sake, that a being is conscious 
only if it possesses higher-order thought, animal ethicists must 
illustrate the capacity for higher-order thought in nonhuman 
animals. Yet, if we grant that nonhuman animals have high-
er-order thought or intentionality in an attempt to ensure their 
moral considerability, we do so at the risk of attributing moral 
agency to them, which would entail that nonhuman animals can 
be “morally evaluated—praised or blamed—for [their] motives 
and actions” (Rowlands 2011, 519). We would then be justi-
fied in attributing notions such as guilty, morally blamewor-
thy, violators of the moral law, and so forth to nonhuman ani-
mals.  
While it is possible for such moral notions to apply to non-
human animals, it would be a mistake to unreflectively assume 
that having HOT entails moral agency. Thus, the following 
discussion should not be misconstrued as an attempt to pre-
serve or take for granted the widespread intuition that moral 
agency should not be attributed to nonhuman animals. Rather, 
this discussion should be perceived as a call for caution when 
attempting to demonstrate animal consciousness in the realm of 
HOT theories. It is a gentle reminder to refrain from too readily 
attributing the most sophisticated cognitive capacities to non-
human animals for the sake of generating moral concern. It is 
a warning that we may find ourselves tempted to demonstrate 
that nonhuman animals possess highly unique and sophisti-
cated capacities, beyond what is necessary for demonstrating 
higher-order thought.  
In avoiding this error, it will be helpful to first clarify what 
moral agency involves: (1) the capacity to form beliefs or 
thoughts about the mental states of others (this is described as 
“mindreading”), and (2) the ability to assess one’s own beliefs, 
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desires, or thoughts about the mental states of others as right 
or wrong.  Keeping this description of moral agency in mind, 
the claim that HOT entails moral agency can be resisted in two 
ways: (1) by illustrating that nonhuman animals can have HOT 
without having the ability to mindread, thus denying that they 
necessarily have regard for the mental states of others even if 
they have metacognition, or (2) by denying that having high-
er-order thoughts about the mental states of others entails the 
further capacity to evaluate such thoughts as right or wrong. 
Thus, even if nonhuman animals have higher-order thoughts 
about their own mental states (metacognition) or the mental 
states of others (mindreading), neither necessarily entail moral 
agency.           
5. Higher-order though, metacognition, and non-
human animals 
The first requirement of moral agency entails the capacity 
to attribute mental states such as beliefs, desires, sensations, 
and perceptions to others. This is known as having a “theory 
of mind.” If one cannot understand that others suffer, feel pain, 
experience happiness, and so forth, then one cannot be held re-
sponsible for affecting another’s mental states since one is un-
aware that one’s actions affect others. In determining whether a 
HOT theory is committed to the conclusion that conscious be-
ings have a theory of mind, we must first consider whether the 
having of higher-order thoughts about one’s own mental states 
(metacognition) requires that one have higher-order thoughts 
about another’s mental states (mindreading).   
A theory of mind, also known as mindreading, is defined 
by Lurz (2009, 282) as “the ability to predict, explain, or un-
derstand the behavior of other subjects by means of attributing 
mental states to them,” which requires, at the very least, having 
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higher-order thoughts about another’s mental states. Carruthers 
(2000) maintains that metacognition entails mindreading: if 
nonhuman animals have higher-order thoughts about their own 
mental states, then they must necessarily be capable of having 
such thoughts about the mental states of others. This idea is of-
ten supported by an appeal to Evans’s “generality constraint,” 
which maintains that in order to have concepts, possessors of 
thought must be capable of combining the concepts they pos-
sess. So, if one has the concept of F, G, a, b, one must be able 
to combine the concepts and form the thoughts Fa, Ga, Fb, 
Gb (Evans: 1982, 100). Keeping this in mind, consider that an 
animal is capable of the following three thoughts: I walk, the 
fox walks, I am in pain. It thus has the concept of I, Fox, walk, 
and pain. According to the generality constraint, the animal 
should be able to combine the concepts in the following way: 
I walk, the fox walks, I am in pain, and the fox is in pain. Thus 
the animal must be able to conceive of other subjects (such as 
foxes) as having different mental properties, such as “the fox is 
in pain.”     
This mindreading requirement is contested by certain phi-
losophers of mind who argue that Carruthers overstates the 
requirements of HOT. Gennaro (2009) and Ridge (2001) ar-
gue that having higher-order thought does not require that one 
be able to mindread—one may very well have higher-order 
thoughts about one’s own mental state without being capable of 
having a higher-order thought about the mental states of others. 
Having higher-order thought only requires the thinker to have 
an implicit “I-thought” which distinguishes the thinker from 
outer objects, but those outer objects “need not always include 
the mental state of other conscious beings” (Gennaro 2004, 45-
66). Such a view is further substantiated by Goldman (2006) 
who argues that self-attribution of mental states is prior to the 
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capacity to attribute mental states to others. Although Gennaro, 
Ridge, and Goldman agree that mindreading is sufficient for 
higher-order thought in nonhuman animals, their claim is that it 
is not necessary for higher-order thought.
The claim that metacognition is possible in the absence of a 
mindreading capacity is often supported by an appeal to self-
confidence studies, such as the one conducted by Smith and 
Washburn (2005). In this study, monkeys learned to control a 
joystick to choose answers in discrimination tests about visual 
patterns on a computer screen. When they selected the correct 
answer, they received treats and when they chose incorrectly, 
they received dreaded timeouts. Unique to this study was a 
“pass” option, which a monkey could choose if the test was too 
difficult. When they selected the pass option, they moved to 
the next test, which was more desirable than a timeout but less 
pleasurable than receiving the treat. The monkeys were said to 
demonstrate a capacity for metacognition when they selected 
the pass button—that is, they were said to be capable of as-
sessing their own level of confidence and understanding when 
they were uncertain. Understanding one’s own uncertainty is an 
instance of metacognition or higher-order thought, yet nothing 
about this instance of metacognition required the monkey to 
have a higher-order thought about another’s mental state. 
Another line of thought which suggests that metacognition 
is possible in the absence of a mindreading capacity is intro-
duced by Lurz (2009), who points out that nonhuman animals 
could have “subject-less” higher-order thoughts or concepts 
without having even an idea of the self, let alone a concept of 
other minds. He asks us to compare animals’ conceiving to our 
conceiving of rain and snow: just as we can be aware that it is 
raining without there being a thing or subject that is raining, a 
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nonhuman animal can be aware that “it hurts” without having 
a concept of a subject who is in pain. Thus, nonhuman animals 
could very well conceive of their mental states as subject-less 
features placed at a time. Lurz (2009, 195) concludes that “the 
HOT theory allows for the presence of conscious states even in 
the absence of any (either self-attributing or other-attributing) 
conscious higher-order thought.”
If higher-order thought does not require that one have 
thoughts about the mental states of others, it is not the case that 
nonhuman animals who have HOT necessarily have regard for 
others, which is required for moral agency. Thus, according to 
this view, having HOT by no means entails moral agency.                 
6. Higher-order thought, mindreading, and non-
human animals     
Carruthers (2008) points out that these self-confidence stud-
ies fail to prove that the subject is incapable of mindreading, 
even though they demonstrate a capacity for higher-order 
thought without employing mindreading capacities in this par-
ticular instance. While these self-confidence studies do indeed 
demonstrate the capacity for metacognition, they do not ex-
clude the possibility of mindreading.
 Keeping this in mind, let us suppose that Carruthers is cor-
rect and that higher-order thought does in fact require mind-
reading. This, then, brings us back to the question of whether 
HOT entails moral agency. A distinct response is to argue that 
even if mindreading is necessary for consciousness, it is not 
sufficient for moral agency. So, even if we grant mindreading 
capabilities to nonhuman animals with the aim of demonstrat-
ing consciousness, they still have not met the conditions for 
moral agency. This is because in order to act as a moral agent, 
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one must also be able to understand the significance (the right-
ness or wrongness) of affecting another’s mental state. This 
involves, what I call, moral thought third-order intentionality, 
which in turn requires two things: (1) third-order intentionality, 
and (2) the ability to possess moral concepts, such as the con-
cepts of rightness and wrongness.
Before proceeding, let us pause to consider what it means 
when we say that a certain mental state has intentionality. Inten-
tionality refers to a representational character: the “about-ness” 
of a thought, belief, or desire. Thoughts, beliefs, and desires are 
intentional states because they are about something: one has a 
desire to drink water, a belief that it will rain, or a thought about 
a cat. First-order intentionality entails that a being has a belief, 
desire, or perception about something, such as a perception of 
the computer screen. According to HOT theory, one must have 
at least second-order intentional states in order to be conscious: 
a thought about another mental state, such as a thought about 
the perception of the computer screen.  
Let us apply these considerations of intentionality to the 
question of moral agency, which entails, at the very least, the 
capacity to form higher-order thoughts about the mental states 
of others (mindreading). According to Lurz (2011), evidence 
of mindreading is found when a being predicts, understands, 
explains, and manipulates the behaviors of others through an 
ability to hypothesize about what is going on in their mind. An 
example that is often pointed to in order to illustrate this capac-
ity for mindreading in nonhuman animals is deception. Inten-
tional deceptive behavior in nonhuman animals, also known as 
the desire to produce a false belief, is evidence of second-order 
intentionality. Deceptive behavior is observed in plover birds 
who lure foxes towards them by pretending to have a broken 
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wing in order to distract the foxes from attacking their nest 
of eggs (Gould, 1999). Likewise, a female baboon is said to 
demonstrate deceptive behavior when she pretends to forage in 
order to prevent the alpha male from discovering that she is en-
gaging in a sexual act with a subordinate male. These examples 
are said to point to an animal’s ability to attribute mental states 
to others and to form a higher-order belief, desire, or thought 
about another’s mental state: plover birds are said to desire to 
produce a false belief in the fox and the female baboon is said 
to desire to produce a false belief in the alpha male. 
In addition to these cases of deception, the ability to mind-
read is said to be apparent in nonhuman animals such as dogs 
who often run for help when their owner is in trouble (Rogers 
1997). Evidently, the dog is said to be capable of assessing the 
anxious mental state of his owner. Rogers (1997, 41) also points 
out that the capacity for mindreading is probable in certain ani-
mals who teach others, since teaching “may be a manifestation 
of the ability to assess the mental state of others.” Teaching, it 
is said, involves mental-state attribution, since the teacher pre-
sumably attributes ignorance to the one who is taught. Further 
evidence of mindreading in the nonhuman animal world is ap-
parent in rats who learn to avoid poison baits by observing the 
reactions of other rats who become ill by consuming the same 
bait (Dawkins, 1993).
Countless empirical examples, beyond the ones mentioned 
in this paper, indicate a capacity for mindreading in all kinds of 
nonhuman animals. Yet, even when assuming that nonhuman 
animals possess HOT about the mental states of others, one 
remains uncommitted to the claim that nonhuman animals are 
thus moral agents. DeGrazia (1996, 172) draws an important 
distinction between being an agent and being a moral agent: 
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those who perform intentional actions are classified as agents, 
while moral agency requires something more than just the 
performance of intentional actions. As he points out, nonhu-
man animals have desires, thoughts, and beliefs that explain 
their actions, which entails that these animals are agents, yet 
it does not mean that they are therefore moral agents. This is 
because moral agency demands more than just having HOTs 
about another’s mental state: moral agency requires what I call 
moral thought third-order intentionality, which requires that 
one not only, for instance, desire to deceive another or pro-
duce a false belief in another, but that one possess the further 
higher-order belief that such a desire to deceive is either right 
or wrong. 
7. Moral agency and moral thought third-order 
intentionality
In supporting my thesis that nonhuman animals do not nec-
essarily possess moral thought third-order intentionality, we 
can refer to Burmúdez (2003), who attributes HOT to nonhu-
man animals, yet maintains that metarepresentational thought 
(thinking about thinking) requires a complex, public language 
that is off-limits to nonhuman animals. In his discussion, Ber-
múdez draws a distinction between having HOT about propo-
sitional mental states and having HOT about non-propositional 
mental states, such as bodily sensations and perceptual expe-
riences. He maintains that nonhuman animals, because they 
are unable to speak or interpret natural language, cannot pos-
sess mental-state concepts for propositional attitudes and thus 
cannot have HOTs about their own or another’s propositional 
attitudes, although he acknowledges that they can have HOT 
about non-propositional mental states, such as bodily sensa-
tions and perceptual experiences. By appealing to Bermúdez’s 
account, we can conclude that although nonhuman animals can 
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form HOTs about another’s mental state (what is referred to as 
perceptual mindreading) by representing the perceptual state of 
another and adjusting their behavior in accordance with such 
representation, they are incapable of forming a HOT about their 
own propositional attitudes, such as a thought about their desire 
to deceive.  
The idea that nonhuman animals can have perceptual or rep-
resentational beliefs without propositional or conceptual con-
tent excludes the possibility that nonhuman animals possess 
moral concepts like rightness or wrongness, which are required 
for moral agency. Yet, let us suppose, contrary to Bermúdez 
(2003) and Glock (2000), that the having of any sort of higher-
order thought requires the possession of concepts. Even if we 
demonstrate that nonhuman animals are able to possess con-
cepts, we are not committed to the view that nonhuman animals 
necessarily possess moral concepts. This is because a HOT 
theory which retains the idea that concepts are the “building 
blocks of thought” only requires conscious beings to have the 
capacity to think in terms of simple concepts. The question, 
then, remains whether or not nonhuman animals can possess 
complex evaluative moral concepts, such as the concepts of 
rightness or wrongness.    
Since having concepts requires that one recognize or dis-
criminate different types of things, we must consider whether 
nonhuman animals can discriminate right actions from actions 
that are not right (Allen 1999). Bekoff and Pierce (2009) point 
to the codes of conduct of certain species of animals that are 
said to demonstrate at least a rudimentary understanding of 
right and wrong. As an example, they point to the rules used by 
coyotes concerning the training of cubs. If cubs bite too hard, 
they are ostracized by the rest of the group and often end up 
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having to leave entirely. Chimpanzees are also said to demon-
strate a sense of justice by setting upon those in the group who 
deviate from the code. Yet, one need not necessarily possess a 
moral concept of “right” or “wrong” in adhering to the code of 
conduct employed by these groups of animals: one can simply 
adhere to these rules because it is the norm of the group. That 
is, although nonhuman animals can distinguish an action that 
violates their group’s code and threatens cooperative behavior 
from one that does not, this does not entail that they judge these 
particular actions to be right or wrong.  Rather, nonhuman ani-
mals can be said to perform those actions which they find to 
be the most preferable after weighing competing desires, such 
as weighing the desire for cooperation against the desire for a 
pleasure associated with disruptive behavior. 
This line of thought is supported by Searle (2001) who argues 
that although nonhuman animals can engage in ends-mean rea-
soning, they cannot have desire-independent reasons for action. 
Keeping the “desire-independent action” thesis in mind, let us 
return to the actions of the plover birds or the female baboons. 
In such scenarios, we should not be so quick to judge that the 
animals formed a thought about the rightness or wrongness of 
their desire to affect another animal’s mental state. Rather, a 
more plausible explanation is that the animals performed their 
actions out of a desire, such as the desire to avoid punishment 
or some other negative consequence like the pain the bird may 
feel from losing its eggs or the chastisement the baboon may 
receive from the alpha male. Thus, even if we acknowledge that 
nonhuman animals possess certain concepts, we still have no 
reason to assume that they employ moral concepts and evalu-
ate their desires and beliefs. Rather, our evidence corroborates 
Searle’s argument: nonhuman animals seem not to act indepen-
dently from their desires. 
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The coyote example is also useful in demonstrating Searle’s 
theory. In demanding that the cubs leave the group for biting 
too hard, the other coyotes seem to respond by “punishing” the 
behavior that threatens the group since there is a strong desire 
for cooperation. This line of thought can also be used to explain 
so-called altruistic actions noted by Gould and Gould (1999, 
150): ‘‘dolphins keep injured members of the group afloat, 
vampire bats share food with starving inhabitants of their col-
ony, [and] elephants help form a defensive circle to protect the 
young of the herd,’’ or the sense of fairness monkeys are said 
to demonstrate in their sharing of food (de Waal 2006). These 
apparent instances of moral behavior or “wild justice” can be 
explained in terms of desire—a desire for cooperation, surviv-
al, or a desire to help others—or in terms of psychological ten-
dencies and capacities for empathy, order, cooperation and so 
forth. That is, we can explain these behaviors independently of 
attributing moral thought third-order intentionality, which re-
quires the possession of moral concepts and HOTs about one’s 
own propositional attitudes. 
To claim that nonhuman animals possess the concept of right 
or wrong entails that they are able to distinguish between moral 
and amoral desires, yet this is unlikely since it is improbable 
that a nonhuman animal possesses such rich evaluative con-
cepts. As DeGrazia points out, there are certain concepts that 
nonhuman animals cannot have because their possession re-
quires a sophisticated language and, evidently, nonhuman ani-
mals do not have a high level of linguistic ability (DeGrazia 
1996, 157). Moral concepts, it seems, are example of concepts 
which are off limits to beings without sophisticated language 
because in order to have a concept like “rightness,” one must be 
able to provide reasons or justification that support the conclu-
sion that said action is right (DeGrazia 1996, 204). Until we are 
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provided with convincing evidence that nonhuman animals are 
able to conceptualize morality, we should continue to describe 
these apparent “moral actions” in terms of desire. 
The underlying concern fundamental to this discussion is 
captured by Morgan’s Canon: “in no case is an animal activity 
to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it 
can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand low-
er in the scale of psychological evolution and development” 
(Morgan 1903, 59). This is not to say that we should always 
provide an inferior explanation of nonhuman animal cognition, 
but it is to say that we may at times lack the appropriate reasons 
or evidence needed to characterize nonhuman animals in the 
same way we characterize human beings. 
My prior discussion assumes that there are obvious similari-
ties between nonhuman animals and human beings in regard to 
their capacity for metacognition; thus, to deny that nonhuman 
animals have “humanlike” characteristics in this respect would 
be anthropedenial: a blindness to the similarities of humans and 
certain nonhumans (de Waal 1999). Yet, there is a disanalogy 
in the moral agency discussion: we simply do not observe mor-
al agency in nonhuman animals while in the self-confidence 
studies or cases of deception we do in fact observe similarities 
between humans and nonhuman animals. There is a mean to 
be found between anthropomorphism and anthropodenial that 
involves recognizing the relevant similarities between humans 
and nonhumans while preserving the differences that cannot be 
reconciled. 
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8. Is it even desirable for nonhuman animals to 
be moral?
We can thus conclude that nonhuman animals may be phe-
nomenally conscious according to HOT theories of conscious-
ness since there is significant evidence that they possess the 
capacity for higher-order thoughts about their own mental 
states and the mental states of others, yet they cannot be said 
to be moral agents since it has not been demonstrated that they 
can attribute the moral concepts of rightness or wrongness to 
their thoughts, desires, or beliefs. As a consequence, nonhuman 
animals should be neither blamed nor praised for their actions; 
thus we should not only refrain from calling nonhuman animals 
“bad” or “evil,” but we should also suspend any tendency to 
classify certain nonhuman animals as “heroes” or “saints” - that 
is, until we have further reason to support the claim that nonhu-
man animals possess complex moral concepts. 
Although this conclusion may seem obvious, we should stop 
to question the common tendency to characterize nonhuman 
animals in an anthropomorphic way in an attempt to awaken or 
incite the public’s moral attention. A paradigm example of this 
“good intentioned” anthropomorphism is apparent when the 
greyhound named Guinefort was venerated as a saint in mid-
13th century France after he was unjustly killed after saving a 
child’s life (Salisbury 1994, 173). 
Recently, less extreme efforts have been made to demon-
strate that certain nonhuman animals possess at least a primi-
tive form of morality (Bekoff 2009; Rowlands 2012; de Waal 
2006). The claim is that some of their actions are motivated by 
kindness, empathy, compassion, altruism, beneficence and so 
forth, which is assumed to demonstrate that nonhuman animals 
are at least moral subjects with their own sense of morality. The 
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fundamental goal, it seems, is to refute human moral exception-
alism: the idea that humans alone are capable of acting morally 
(Rowlands 2012). While Bekoff, Rowlands, and de Waal con-
cede that these sorts of behaviors do not demonstrate full blown 
moral agency, they adamantly insist that they are indicators of 
at least a primitive moral code, thus concluding that humans are 
not the only moral beings.  
A pressing concern remains: why are we so adamant about 
demonstrating that nonhuman animals can act morally or that 
they are often “motivated by moral reasons” (Rowlands 2012), 
acting in ways that express more than just pro-social behavior 
(Bekoff 2009)? Do we really want to, by pointing to the “moral 
dimension” of nonhuman animals, open the door to clichés such 
as the claim that human beings are justified in eating meat or ex-
ploiting nonhuman animals because they “deserve” such treat-
ment since they themselves viciously and cruelly kill, hurt, and 
injure other animals? If virtuous behavior is possible, so then is 
vicious behavior, yet seldom do we see significant attention af-
forded to animal behavior that could easily be characterized as 
vicious or cruel: ant colonies which are said to fight genocidal 
wars and enslave other ants (Foitzik & Herbers 2007), male 
bottlenose dolphins who aggressively “herd” females by chas-
ing, biting, and slamming into them with their bodies (Connor 
et al 1992), and ducks, geese, and white-fronted bee-eaters who 
commonly engage in forced mating (Emlen & Wrege 1986). 
 If we can illustrate the capacity for higher-order thought in 
nonhuman animals (beliefs and desires) without presupposing 
that they possess a “moral code,” it seems superfluous and even 
dangerous to direct our efforts at describing their so-called 
moral traits. Thus, animal ethicists should pause to consider 
that it may very well be contrary and detrimental to the ani-
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mal ethics vision to spend so much energy demonstrating how 
humanlike certain nonhuman animals are in their ability to act 
morally.    
This is not to suggest that we should refuse to investigate, 
out of respect and wonder for nonhuman animals, their com-
plex mental life. Sure, it stimulates a response of awe, appre-
ciation, and wonder when we hear about the hungry rhesus 
monkeys who would not take food if doing so gave another 
monkey an electric shock, the gorilla who rescued a child who 
fell into her enclosure at the zoo, or the canine who weaved in 
and out traffic in order to rescue his unconscious companion 
in the midst of a busy highway. But if these “moral behaviors” 
are: (1) not needed to ground a theory of animal consciousness, 
and (2) irrelevant to the discussion of genuine moral agency, 
why is there such a relentless philosophical determination to 
characterize these actions as moral? 
9. Conclusion
We should remain open to describing the behavior of nonhu-
man animals in terms of pro-social behavior rather than as mor-
al behavior. Characterizing the behaviors of nonhuman animals 
as “moral” is seemingly unhelpful: it is not conducive to the 
goal of ensuring their moral considerability, and furthermore, 
it may in fact provide a justification (however bad it might be) 
or motivation for killing or exploiting them. Consciousness 
does not require the capacity for moral behavior, even under 
a HOT theory of consciousness, and it would behoove the ani-
mal ethicist to recognize this, lest they risk denying conscious-
ness or moral consideration to other, less sophisticated or less 
interesting nonhuman animals. Thus, rather than try to satisfy 
the anthropocentric demands of western morality that valorizes 
humanlike traits and characteristics, animal ethicists should re-
Cheryl Abbate
24
© Between the Species, 2014
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 17, Issue 1
main firm in pursuing an account of animal consciousness and 
moral considerability that does not aspire to demonstrate how 
much nonhuman animals are like human beings in their ability 
to act morally. 
In doing so, we should respect the possibility that nonhu-
man animals and human beings are indeed different in regard 
to their cognitive and moral capacities, yet this difference does 
not entail the inferiority of nonhuman animals. As far as we 
know, it is only human beings who can, with their more sophis-
ticated intellectual capacities, perform vicious, atrocious, cruel 
and deceptive actions such as mass genocide, killing, raping, 
stealing, and other heinous crimes. In the spirit of Nietzsche, 
who writes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that “man is the cruelest 
animal,” we should recognize that nonhuman animals possess 
limited cognitive capacities and are thus indeed unlike human 
beings, yet this intellectual or cognitive difference is one that 
we should, for once, embrace for the sake of all nonhuman ani-
mals. We should consider whether comparing nonhuman ani-
mals to human beings is insulting and offensive to nonhuman 
animals animals, since human beings, with our “morality,” are 
the only beings we have reason to believe are “so artfully, so 
artistically cruel” (Dostoyevsky 2002, 238).
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